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AI-generated illustration of pigs and a modern farm at sunrise, symbolizing patient observation of the hog cycle.

Waiting for Hog Prices to Turn Higher: My Bull Case for the Hog Cycle and How I Choose My Exposure

Sep 7, 2026•14 min read•Hog-Cycle Investing Notes

The easiest mistake in this hog cycle is to assume that fewer breeding sows immediately mean less pork supply. This article explains how I assess effective capacity and use Muyuan, Dongrui Food Group, and Muyuan’s A- and H-shares as different expressions of the same cycle.

As of September 2026, my view of this hog cycle remains that the direction has become more favorable, but the timing is not yet fully confirmed.

By the end of the second quarter of 2026, China’s breeding-sow inventory had fallen to 37.8 million head, down 6.5% year over year. Yet during the same first half, hog slaughter increased by 1.7% and pork output rose by 3.3%.

There were fewer sows, but more pork.

That apparent contradiction is the starting point of how I think about this hog cycle. (National Bureau of Statistics data) My core view is not simply that “the sow herd is shrinking, so hog prices must rise immediately.” It is this:

Nominal capacity has begun to contract, but whether effective supply is truly falling still needs to be confirmed by PSY, piglet numbers, slaughter weights, and secondary fattening.

I am therefore not betting on an immediate surge in hog prices. I am waiting for the decline in statistical capacity to work its way into the supply of market hogs and, eventually, into producers’ earnings.

In choosing securities, I use Muyuan as the core expression of the hog cycle and Dongrui Food Group (SZSE: 001201) as a small-cap, high-convexity satellite. Muyuan provides core-cycle certainty through cost, scale, financing resilience, and operating continuity. Dongrui provides satellite convexity only if it executes both sides of its operating challenge: lowering cost and growing sales volume. Choosing between Muyuan’s A- and H-shares is a separate vehicle decision. It must not become an excuse to increase my total exposure to the company.

My company comparison is based on disclosures available through September 8, 2026.

The three clocks do not move together

At least three clocks matter when analyzing the hog cycle:

  • Sows and piglets represent future supply.
  • Market hogs and slaughter weights represent current supply.
  • Share prices represent the market’s expectations for future earnings.

These clocks rarely bottom at the same time.

The timeline below describes my transmission framework. It is not a forecast of exact dates.

The real lesson from this chart is that I cannot use today’s sow data to explain today’s hog price. Nor can I wait until the entire profit recovery appears in financial statements before admitting that the stocks have entered a new cycle.

The difficulty of cyclical investing is that all three clocks must be watched even though they operate in different time zones.

The sow herd is not the complete production function

Breeding-sow inventory is important, but it is not effective supply itself.

A more complete approximation is:

Effective pork supply ≈ breeding sows × PSY × survival rate × slaughter weight

If the industry removes its least productive sows first, the remaining herd may produce larger litters and achieve higher piglet survival rates. A 6.5% decline in the sow herd would therefore not necessarily translate into a 6.5% decline in effective piglet supply.

If producers also hold hogs longer or use secondary fattening to increase slaughter weights, the decline in final pork supply could be reduced further.

The question I care about is therefore not merely whether the sow herd is shrinking. It is whether that decline is large enough to outrun improvements in production efficiency.

The confirmation signals I want to see include:

  • A sustained year-over-year decline in newborn piglets.
  • PSY improvements that are insufficient to offset sow reductions.
  • Total hog inventory moving from growth into contraction.
  • Falling slaughter weights.
  • Pork production eventually turning negative.

If only the sow herd declines while piglet supply, finishing inventory, slaughter weights, and pork production continue to rise, the industry has achieved nominal capacity reduction—not an effective contraction in supply.

Secondary fattening changes the timing, not the direction

Secondary fattening is one of the easiest variables to misread in this cycle.

When the market expects hog prices to rise, secondary-fattening buyers purchase standard-weight hogs. This reduces immediate supply to slaughterhouses and can push prices sharply higher. Rising prices then attract more secondary-fattening demand, creating a short-term positive feedback loop.

But secondary fattening does not eliminate supply. It moves today’s hogs into the future and makes them heavier.

Secondary fattening is an inventory transporter and a volatility amplifier, not a source of long-term demand.

It can make hog prices rise earlier, but it can also concentrate the future release of heavier hogs and reverse the previous gains.

I use secondary-fattening activity to assess the rhythm of the next month or two. I do not use it to determine the direction of the entire hog cycle.

Similarly, government rotation or incremental purchases of frozen pork can support sentiment and absorb some immediate supply. But these measures primarily address the problem that prices are too low today. Reductions in sows and piglets address the problem that future supply is too high.

Policy support is secondary evidence. The industry’s own capacity clearing remains the main thesis.

Where I believe the cycle stands

I currently define this stage as:

A volatile bottom accompanied by accelerating capacity reduction, while the market waits for effective supply contraction to reach the slaughter stage.

This does not mean the main upward move has already begun. Nor does it mean that a supply inflection point does not exist.

Near-term supply may remain heavy because of large producers’ output, the release of hogs previously held for secondary fattening, and elevated slaughter weights. But if low hog prices continue to generate industry losses while piglet restocking remains weak, the foundation for a future supply improvement will become progressively stronger.

I do not expect a supply collapse comparable to 2019. I expect a milder repair that could last longer:

  1. Low hog prices force high-cost capacity to exit.
  2. The number of newborn piglets begins to decline.
  3. Secondary-fattening inventory is gradually absorbed.
  4. Slaughter weights fall.
  5. Hog prices move above the industry cost line.
  6. Low-cost producers return to profitability first.

In other words, I am not trading a sudden shortage of pork. I am trading a repricing of the industry cost curve after a prolonged period of losses.

Muyuan and Dongrui serve different purposes

Muyuan and Dongrui could both benefit from higher hog prices, but they are not the same trade.

Muyuan provides core-cycle certainty; Dongrui provides satellite convexity if—and only if—cost reduction and sales-volume growth are both executed.

The Muyuan thesis rests on cost, scale, access to financing, and operating continuity. If the hog-price recovery arrives later than expected, its cost advantage should help it remain in the game longer than most competitors. Once hog prices move above its full cost, scale can amplify the recovery in profits. That is why I treat Muyuan as the core expression rather than simply the producer with the most share-price sensitivity.

Dongrui is a qualitatively small-cap satellite, not simply “a higher-beta Muyuan.” Hog products generated 96.33% of consolidated operating revenue in 2025, giving the company high direct revenue exposure to hog prices and sales volume. It sold 1.4774 million hogs in 2025, up 68.96% year over year; separately, reported production volume was 2.1565 million head, up 62.20%. These are facts from the company’s 2025 annual report, not a forecast that the same growth rates will continue.

The next question is whether greater capacity absorption can turn that volume growth into lower unit cost. Management said unit depreciation and amortization had fallen from RMB 1.76/kg in 2024 to RMB 1.52/kg in 2025 and RMB 1.20/kg in the first quarter of 2026 as volume expanded. (May 11, 2026 investor-relations record) But at the August results briefing, management reported that company-wide full cost was still RMB 13.8/kg in July—the same level disclosed for April—and reiterated a year-end target below RMB 13/kg. The target remains an execution test, not an achieved result. (August 28, 2026 investor-relations record)

Volume has continued to expand, but the annual hurdle is demanding. Dongrui’s August sales brief reported unaudited year-to-date sales of 1.1309 million hogs. I use reported monthly sales as a practical proxy for progress toward management’s stated 2.0 million-head output goal for 2026. On that basis, the remaining 869,100 head imply an average of about 217,300 per month from September through December—roughly 54% above the January–August sales average. This is a simple proxy-based run-rate test, not a forecast, and it makes the output target a live risk rather than a settled assumption. (August 2026 sales brief; January 30, 2026 investor-relations record)

This creates the convexity. A smaller producer that fills available capacity, spreads fixed costs across more sales, and closes part of its cost gap can experience a larger change in earnings power when hog prices recover. But sales growth without cost reduction could merely scale weak economics, while cost reduction without sales growth would leave part of the operating leverage unrealized. I require both.

Financial runway is the other constraint. Dongrui reported an attributable loss of RMB 425.0 million, negative operating cash flow of RMB 138.4 million, and a 52.88% debt-to-assets ratio for the first half of 2026. These figures reinforce its satellite role and reduce its ability to wait indefinitely for the cycle. (2026 interim report) Separately, the top five customers represented 46.68% of 2025 revenue, while overseas revenue represented 19.21%. The premium Hong Kong channel is a differentiator, but disruptions to quotas, inspection, logistics, animal health, food safety, or major customers could weaken that advantage.

The radar chart below is only my subjective qualitative comparison framework. It is not an objective rating, valuation model, or price-target model. A higher score means more of the named trait—not necessarily better investment quality—and the polygon area is not a composite score.

This chart does not answer which company is guaranteed to rise more. It answers what purpose each company should serve.

Muyuan is better suited to be the core expression of the hog cycle because its low cost, scale, financing resilience, and operating continuity reduce the number of things that must go right. Dongrui is the satellite because its outcome is more sensitive to execution: capacity absorption must improve, sales must grow, and those changes must actually lower full cost. Its smaller capitalization also brings greater liquidity and volatility risk.

A lower Dongrui share price is not itself a reason for me to add exposure. The thesis strengthens only when reported operating evidence shows that cost is moving toward the stated target while sales growth and the annual output goal remain on track.

Muyuan A-shares or H-shares?

Muyuan’s H-shares began trading on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on February 6, 2026, under stock code 02714. (Hong Kong Stock Exchange listing announcement)

The A- and H-shares represent the same underlying operating assets.

Holding both does not provide diversification at the company level. The two listings differ in valuation, liquidity, currency exposure, taxes, fees, and investor base, but their underlying risk still comes from the same farms, balance sheet, and hog cycle.

The right question is not:

I already own Muyuan A-shares. Should I buy another allocation through the H-shares?

It is:

Within my predetermined total exposure to Muyuan, which market provides the better vehicle?

I calculate the premium as follows, using the CNY value of one Hong Kong dollar:

A-share premium to H-shares = A-share price ÷ (H-share price × CNY per HKD) − 1

After accounting for liquidity, taxes, fees, currency exposure, and the possibility that the discount may persist indefinitely, I currently use the following personal guidelines:

A-share premium to H-shares My preferred vehicle
Below 20% A-shares are more convenient
20%–25% Begin watching the H-shares
25%–30% Prefer H-shares for new Muyuan exposure
Above 30% The relative appeal of H-shares becomes significant
Above 35% Consider an equal-value switch from some A-shares into H-shares

These ranges are personal trading rules. They are not objective valuation conclusions or real-time buy and sell signals.

The most important constraint is:

Switching from A-shares to H-shares may change the vehicle, but combined A- and H-share holdings must not exceed the predetermined total risk exposure to Muyuan.

Cheap H-shares are not risk-free, and an A/H discount is not guaranteed to close. If the company’s earnings do not materialize, the discount will not automatically create a return.

What would prove me wrong?

This trading thesis must be falsifiable.

The most important risk is not merely a broad market decline caused by a financial crisis. It is that the supply gap I expect never appears—or that a company fails to convert it into earnings.

If the entire A-share market suffers a valuation sell-off while sow numbers, piglet supply, slaughter weights, and company costs do not deteriorate, that is closer to share-price risk.

But if the sow herd begins expanding again, PSY continues to improve, slaughter weights increase, and pork output keeps growing, the problem is no longer that the market is mispricing the stocks. It means the expected contraction in supply has failed to materialize.

For Dongrui, the company-level thesis fails if full cost stalls materially above management’s target; sales growth or the stated annual goal misses; improving capacity absorption does not reduce unit cost; or low hog prices persist long enough to impair execution and financial runway. Farm-level cost dispersion, concentrated customers and channels, small-cap liquidity, and price volatility add further risk. None of those risks is repaired merely because the share price falls.

My conditional action rules

I will not become more confident in a cycle reversal merely because hog prices rise on a particular day.

I place more weight on the following combination:

Hog prices stop making new lows
+ the sow herd continues to contract at a reasonable pace
+ newborn piglet numbers decline
+ slaughter weights fall
+ low-cost producers retain their operating advantage

For Muyuan, I monitor costs, cash flow, sow capacity, and capital expenditure. The cycle thesis only enters the earnings-realization stage if Muyuan’s cost advantage persists while effective industry supply begins to decline.

For Dongrui, I monitor two linked scoreboards. The first is cost: reported full cost must move below the July level toward management’s below-RMB 13/kg target, and greater capacity absorption must be visible in lower unit cost rather than only higher volume. The second is growth: reported monthly sales—used only as a practical proxy—must indicate that the gap to the 2.0 million-head output goal is closing without undermining efficiency or financial runway. If one scoreboard advances while the other stalls, the satellite thesis is incomplete.

For the A/H decision, I compare the two markets only within my predetermined Muyuan exposure. If the valuation gap is not large enough to compensate for transaction friction and the risk of a persistent discount, I will not switch merely because the H-shares appear cheaper.

Conclusion

The easiest mistake in this hog cycle is to treat the sow count as supply itself.

The sow herd tells me the direction. PSY and survival rates determine effective capacity. Secondary fattening and slaughter weights determine the short-term rhythm. The industry cost curve determines who survives long enough to benefit from the reversal.

I ultimately use three different tools to express the same view:

Muyuan provides the core certainty of the hog-cycle thesis through cost, scale, financing resilience, and operating continuity.
Dongrui provides small-cap satellite convexity only if cost reduction and sales-volume growth are both executed.
Muyuan’s A/H choice improves the investment vehicle rather than increasing risk exposure.

I do not need to predict the exact day on which hog prices will bottom.

I need to keep answering three questions:

  1. Is the industry genuinely clearing capacity?
  2. Who can survive until the supply gap appears?
  3. By the time profits begin to recover, how much has the market already priced in?

That is how I understand the hog-cycle trade.


This article records my personal research framework and conditional views. It does not constitute investment advice, a promise of returns, or a recommendation to buy or sell any security. The radar chart and A/H ranges are qualitative research tools, not objective ratings. Market and company conditions may change; investors should independently verify the information and assume responsibility for their own decisions.

Next articleThe Hog Cycle: Anticipating the Turn, Planning the Exit

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On this page

  • The three clocks do not move together
  • The sow herd is not the complete production function
  • Secondary fattening changes the timing, not the direction
  • Where I believe the cycle stands
  • Muyuan and Dongrui serve different purposes
  • Muyuan A-shares or H-shares?
  • What would prove me wrong?
  • My conditional action rules
  • Conclusion