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The Hog Cycle: Anticipating the Turn, Planning the Exit

Nov 14, 2026•18 min read•Hog-Cycle Investing Notes

Capacity reductions are building the conditions for a turn. Historical valuations per head from 2022 and 2024 help identify high ground, while sow numbers and the depth and duration of tightening guide when to hold and when to exit.

This article continues my hog-cycle investment framework. The first part covers the investment thesis and stock selection; this follow-up focuses on the approaching turn and how to judge an exit during the upturn.

Structure revised November 13, 2026. Market prices remain as of November 6; industry data run through Q3 2026. Historical data, percentiles and conversion assumptions are unchanged. This revision does not refresh market prices.

Hog prices remain low, while production capacity is contracting. My view of this cycle is that continued capacity reductions are building the conditions for a turn. For now, the question is whether those cuts reach actual hog output. Once the upturn is reflected in share prices, the question becomes how much of the improvement market capitalisation per head already captures.

I am willing to invest ahead of that turn and endure volatility before it arrives. As the cycle advances, the reasons for holding will need to evolve. Sow numbers can shift from decline to recovery, supply can begin to rebuild, and shares may price in both changes before they reach the physical market.

This article follows three judgments: why a turn is worth anticipating, how to recognise high valuations during an upturn, and how to revise historical comparisons as conditions change. Use history to gauge the room for upside, and current conditions to decide when to leave.

Prices remain low; the conditions for a turn are forming

China's breeding sow herd fell from 37.80 million at the end of Q2 to 36.02 million at the end of Q3, down about 4.7% in one quarter and 10.7% year on year. Yet hog output in the first three quarters rose 1.4%, and pork production rose 3.2%. First-half data, first-three-quarter data

A smaller sow herd affects future production. The hogs reaching the market today come from herds built earlier. Sow numbers can therefore fall while current supply remains plentiful. Low prices today cannot, on their own, show that earlier capacity reductions have had no effect.

Cobweb model: the lag between prices and supplyDemand curve D, supply-decision curve S and a cobweb path with directional arrows. Producers use the previous price to determine subsequent supply; the demand curve determines the current market price. Illustrative parameters produce a converging path. The model is not fitted to actual hog prices and does not imply that this cycle must converge.Hog price PSupply QDemand DSupply SEStart

An illustrative cobweb model, not fitted to actual hog prices. The narrowing swings show one possible outcome chosen to explain the mechanism.

The vertical axis shows hog prices; the horizontal axis shows supply. D represents demand, and S represents future supply decisions made in response to prices. Starting at the lower right: low prices encourage production cuts, moving the path left; when that lower supply reaches the market, prices move up; higher prices encourage restocking, moving the path right; when the extra supply arrives, prices move down. A horizontal move shows how production decisions change supply after a delay. A vertical move shows the market price associated with that quantity. Model explanation

For a shareholder, the useful reminder is the delay. A decision to cut production takes time to reduce the number of hogs reaching the market. If prices stay depressed during that interval, producers may keep cutting. By the time the supply contraction becomes visible, the adjustment may have gone further than needed. This is how an overshoot can develop.

Policy adds another constraint. The 2026 plan calls for production registration by large hog producers, regulatory guidance, and adjustments to breeding, restocking and slaughter weights. It can help restrain disorderly expansion, while also supporting stable production and supply. The sow herd remains within the policy's green zone. Falling below the normal reference level alone does not establish a hog shortage. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs plan

Capacity that has already exited is the starting point for my view that a turn is approaching. If piglet and market-hog supply tighten, and the company's own sales capacity remains intact, a single share-price pullback will not readily persuade me to sell.

If better productivity and heavier slaughter weights offset the capacity cuts, or demand falls faster than supply, the expected shortage may fail to emerge. I would then need to acknowledge that my original judgment was wrong. Holding through volatility requires distinguishing a moving share price from a change in the reasons I bought.

The production cycle offers a starting point. Company disclosures describe the breeding sow herd as a leading indicator of theoretical hog output about 10–12 months ahead. Applying that interval to the Q3 2026 capacity contraction points to supply developments in Q2–Q3 2027. This is my inference; breeding schedules, productivity and the timing of sales can change the actual lag. Production-cycle reference

I therefore use “an approaching turn” to describe conditions taking shape. It does not identify a particular month or imply that the next rebound in hog prices will continue uninterrupted. The development that matters most is whether fewer breeding sows translate into tighter piglet and market-hog supply. If that transmission continues, today's low prices deserve to be viewed within the longer production cycle.

When the upturn arrives, valuations per head help identify the high ground

Buying during a downturn calls for an exit framework that remains usable when shares rise. The valuation already assigned by the market provides one measure.

I use 2022 and 2024 as two conditional reference samples. Whichever year's supply tightening relative to demand more closely resembles the future situation deserves more weight. An outcome between the two calls for a valuation between the two sets of observations.

The fall in sow numbers alone cannot tell us how tight supply will become. The cumulative declines before these two upturns were about 8.5% and 9.2%, yet market capitalisation per head differed substantially. The initial surplus, productivity, demand, delayed selling and secondary fattening all affect the outcome. Expectations for company growth and the wider market also influence share prices. I retain 2022 as a reference, while considering disease-related effects on both industry supply and individual companies. Methodology and sources

Stocks can begin pricing in an improvement before hog prices rise, so the statistical window needs to reach back. The windows used here are January–October 2022, with 41 weekly observations, and January–August 2024, with 34. I take the last trading day of each week and calculate market capitalisation per head using the share count and comparable trailing 12-month sales disclosed at that time.

P50 shows the median valuation over the window. P75–P90 is my observation band for historically high valuations. P75 and P90 are the values at the 75th and 90th percentiles when the observations are ordered from low to high. This is a method I have chosen; the percentiles do not describe the probability of reaching a future price. P95 and the highest weekly observation are in the appendix for reference, and as a reminder that a brief historical peak is not a return I can count on capturing. Full calculations and sources

2024 P90: 4,0312024 P75: 3,8272024 P50: 3,7222022 P90: 8,1602022 P75: 7,8042022 P50: 6,386Lower (left edge: 2000)Higher (right edge: 10000)Muyuan: market cap per head, combined windowsMuyuan: market cap per head, combined windows

The conversion is straightforward: historical market capitalisation per head × assumed annual hog sales = corresponding market capitalisation; corresponding market capitalisation ÷ total shares = corresponding share price.

For Muyuan, the two windows give:

  • 2024 sample: P50 of about RMB 3,722 per head; P75–P90 of about RMB 3,827–4,031 per head.
  • 2022 sample: P50 of about RMB 6,386 per head; P75–P90 of about RMB 7,804–8,160 per head.

Assume annual sales of 78 million market hogs—the midpoint of the company's 75–81 million annual plan—and 5,772,996,148 shares, including H shares. The 2024 high band gives a corresponding market capitalisation of about RMB 298.5–314.4 billion and a corresponding share price of RMB 51.70–54.46. The 2022 band gives RMB 608.7–636.5 billion and RMB 105.44–110.25 per share. These numbers answer a specific question: if sales reach the assumed level and the market assigns the historical valuation per head again, what would that imply per share? Annual report, share-capital announcement

Muyuan closed at RMB 44.40 on November 6, equivalent to about RMB 3,286 per head under that sales assumption. The gap to the 2024 high band is about 16%–23%. That is a measurable amount of room. Tighter and longer-lasting supply conditions than in 2024 would give us a reason to discuss a higher valuation. Using 2022 also requires allowing for changes in the company's scale and growth rate. Market price on the observation date

One detail is easy to miss: the highest valuation per head need not coincide with the highest share price. In 2022, Muyuan's weekly market-capitalisation-per-head peak came on February 11, while its adjusted weekly share-price peak came on July 8. Across the combined 2022 window, disclosed trailing 12-month market-hog sales rose from 36.887 million to 53.656 million, an increase of about 45.5%. Dividing the same market capitalisation by more hogs produces a lower figure per head.

To examine the effect of that changing denominator, I recalculated every week using the trailing 12-month sales figure known at the end of the window. P75–P90 fell from RMB 7,804–8,160 to RMB 5,799–5,884 per head. This check uses information disclosed later, so it serves only to explain the historical result: part of the high 2022 ratio came from the smaller sales base earlier in the window. Sales baseline announcement, diagnostic details

I therefore retain 2022 as a reference for higher valuations, but RMB 105–110 is not yet a direct selling target. Its relevance depends on sales delivery, growth and the valuation the market is willing to assign. The 2024 sample is closer to today's sales scale and easier to compare. Today's RMB 3,286 per head uses assumed annual sales; the historical figures use then-disclosed actual trailing 12-month sales. They cannot be used directly to rank today's valuation within the historical distribution.

There is also a share-class convention for Muyuan. I value A and H shares at the same per-share price here to obtain an A-share-equivalent price. Actual combined market capitalisation requires pricing the A and H shares separately and converting them into the same currency.

2024 P90: 10,0882024 P75: 9,3552024 P50: 8,2882022 P90: 21,2362022 P75: 20,0062022 P50: 18,477Lower (left edge: 0)Higher (right edge: 28000)Dongrui: market cap per head, total-hog basisDongrui: market cap per head, total-hog basis

For Dongrui, total hog sales provide a supplementary comparison:

  • 2024 sample: P50 of about RMB 8,288 per head; P75–P90 of about RMB 9,355–10,088 per head.
  • 2022 sample: P50 of about RMB 18,477 per head; P75–P90 of about RMB 20,006–21,236 per head.

Assume annual total hog sales of 1.7 million and 257,784,001 shares. The 2024 high band gives a corresponding market capitalisation of about RMB 15.90–17.15 billion and a corresponding share price of RMB 61.69–66.53. The 2022 band gives RMB 34.01–36.10 billion and RMB 131.93–140.05 per share. The 1.7 million assumption is my rounded annualisation of sales in the first nine months. It includes different categories of hogs and must not be treated as market-hog sales. Sales report, Q3 report

Dongrui closed at RMB 16.26 on November 6, equivalent to about RMB 2,466 per head under that sales assumption. Market price on the observation date

The corresponding prices above look far removed from today's price. But Dongrui's small early sales base has an even stronger effect on the comparison. The assumed 1.7 million hogs is about 4.36 times the disclosed trailing 12-month volume at the 2022 per-head peak, and 2.93 times the volume at the 2024 peak. If the earlier market capitalisation already reflected future expansion, multiplying that high historical ratio by a much larger sales volume could count growth twice.

I therefore retain RMB 61–67 and RMB 132–140 as calculation results, but they are not yet suitable for deciding when to sell. Market-hog sales were not disclosed continuously in 2024. None of the 34 weekly observations can be calculated from a complete set of direct disclosures on that basis. Total hog sales do not close this gap. My confidence in an industry recovery can be stronger than my confidence in a particular Dongrui share price.

I also extended the windows in both directions to see how much the bands changed.

  • Muyuan's 2024 results are relatively stable. Extending the lead-in from three to six months, and moving the end date back by one or three months, changes P75 by no more than about 1.2% and P90 by no more than about 0.4% across the tests.
  • Dongrui's 2024 results depend slightly more on the window. The widest window lowers P75 by about 5.6% and P90 by about 2.9%. The peak date is unchanged.
  • The lower end of Muyuan's 2022 high band changes more. Extending the end date by three months lowers P75 from RMB 7,804 to RMB 6,812 per head, about 12.7%, while P90 falls only about 1.8%. Dongrui's corresponding declines are about 2.9% and 1.9%.

Extending the 2022 lead-in to six months requires Q4 2021 prices and a 2020 sales baseline, which are not yet complete. For that cycle, only extensions beyond the original end date are available. Part of the earlier window would also enter the African swine fever years previously excluded from the sample. Even once the data are available, that extension should be shown separately.

These comparisons make the limits clearer: historical highs are useful references, and every number has a context. The 2024 sample offers a relatively stable benchmark. The 2022 sample shows that higher valuations have occurred, but the contributions of supply and demand and company growth have not been separated. The future may also fall between them. This cycle's supply, demand and company performance should determine which reference is relevant.

History provides a scale; current conditions determine which one to use

2022 and 2024 are conditional samples. This cycle's supply and demand will determine the outcome. I first assess the degree and duration of effective supply tightening, then choose the closest historical valuation band, and finally check whether the company's sales scale and growth are comparable.

  • Tightness resembles 2024: give more weight to the 2024 high observation band.
  • Tightness is deeper and more persistent, resembling 2022: consider the higher 2022 band, while accounting for the small early sales base and growth expectations.
  • Conditions fall between them: retain an intermediate band. The available data do not justify a precise weighting.
  • Productivity, slaughter weights or demand changes offset capacity cuts: reassess the expected upside. Historical highs cannot guarantee this cycle's outcome.

Breeding sow numbers therefore run through the whole judgment. The size of the decline indicates the potential adjustment; its duration affects how long tightening may last; a sustained recovery warns that the next supply expansion is taking shape. A single monthly change can be noisy. I want to read the trend alongside breeding, piglet and actual output data.

When should I start considering an exit?

Shares may reflect these changes in advance, so that period cannot be treated as a forecast of the stock-market peak. As the supply effect approaches, I want to consider two things together: how much improvement is already reflected in valuation per head, and whether new capacity is beginning to prepare the next supply recovery.

A rebound in sow numbers would provide an early signal, but one monthly increase does not end the trade. In May 2024, the breeding sow herd was already up 0.2% month on month while hog prices were still rising. Historical data

The later part of the move, as I see it, looks roughly like this: valuation has reached a relatively high band consistent with the current supply-demand balance; breeding and piglet data show capacity recovering; the share price already reflects tight supply; and new supply is taking shape. When these valuation and capacity changes appear together, I become more willing to sell and accept missing the final stretch.

In practice, I do not need to insist on P75, or wait for sow numbers to rise. If the share price already reflects the improvement fully, I can leave first. If changes in supply and demand invalidate the original judgment, I should consider exiting even if the shares have not reached the price I had hoped for.

In a weak market, keep the same focus on supply, demand and valuation.

A weak market may limit the upside or lengthen the wait. Thinking through the possible outcomes beforehand makes it easier to respond calmly.

Stock and index returns by stage in two cyclesStage returns: comparison around zeroMatched windows · adjusted stocks · price indexMuyuanDongruiCSI 3002022 windows-40-200+20+40Earlypricing+7.0%+13.1%−14.5%Hog-pricerise−18.5%−16.5%−16.9%Post-peakcontinuation+3.0%−0.2%+9.8%2024 windows-40-200+20+40Earlypricing+5.1%−7.2%+3.1%Hog-pricerise−11.4%−32.5%−6.1%Post-peakcontinuation+25.6%+13.2%+22.7%Price change over each stage (%)2022 Early pricing Muyuan: +7.0%; 2021-12-31 to 2022-03-31; 2022 Early pricing Dongrui: +13.1%; 2021-12-31 to 2022-03-31; 2022 Early pricing CSI 300: −14.5%; 2021-12-31 to 2022-03-31; 2022 Hog-price rise Muyuan: −18.5%; 2022-03-31 to 2022-10-31; 2022 Hog-price rise Dongrui: −16.5%; 2022-03-31 to 2022-10-31; 2022 Hog-price rise CSI 300: −16.9%; 2022-03-31 to 2022-10-31; 2022 Post-peak continuation (core) Muyuan: +3.0%; 2022-10-31 to 2022-11-30; 2022 Post-peak continuation (core) Dongrui: −0.2%; 2022-10-31 to 2022-11-30; 2022 Post-peak continuation (core) CSI 300: +9.8%; 2022-10-31 to 2022-11-30; 2024 Early pricing Muyuan: +5.1%; 2023-12-29 to 2024-03-29; 2024 Early pricing Dongrui: −7.2%; 2023-12-29 to 2024-03-29; 2024 Early pricing CSI 300: +3.1%; 2023-12-29 to 2024-03-29; 2024 Hog-price rise Muyuan: −11.4%; 2024-03-29 to 2024-08-30; 2024 Hog-price rise Dongrui: −32.5%; 2024-03-29 to 2024-08-30; 2024 Hog-price rise CSI 300: −6.1%; 2024-03-29 to 2024-08-30; 2024 Post-peak continuation (core) Muyuan: +25.6%; 2024-08-30 to 2025-07-31; 2024 Post-peak continuation (core) Dongrui: +13.2%; 2024-08-30 to 2025-07-31; 2024 Post-peak continuation (core) CSI 300: +22.7%; 2024-08-30 to 2025-07-31

Returns between window endpoints; maximum drawdowns within each window are not shown. Dates and calculation conventions are in the appendix.

In Q1 2022, the CSI 300 fell 14.5%, while Muyuan rose 7.0% and Dongrui rose 13.1%. During the subsequent April–October hog-price rise, the two stocks fell 18.5% and 16.5%, while the CSI 300 fell 16.9%. Both companies also declined during the April–August 2024 rise in hog prices. Stage calculations

These episodes show that an industry rally can take place in a bear market, but rising hog prices do not guarantee rising shares. Stage returns alone cannot separate the effects of the broader market, company developments and gains already priced in. They also cannot establish a fixed “bear-market discount.”

I would respond to three situations as follows:

  • Valuation has reached the relevant level, but the market remains weak. I would sell according to the original judgment. An advance that has already arrived is worth realising. I do not need to wait for a bull market in the hope of a better exit.
  • Valuation has fallen short of expectations, but recovering capacity has already eased supply tightness. I would accept making less than expected and sell or reduce the position. A historical median does not have to be reached simply because I have not made enough. A bear market can shorten the part of the move available to capture.
  • The broader market is falling, while supply is still tightening, company sales are on track, and the shares have yet to reflect the improvement fully. I would lean toward holding and give the industry changes time. That requires a position sized to withstand volatility, without relying on leverage or money I need back in the short term.

If sow numbers have risen just once, while breeding and piglet data have yet to move consistently, I would treat that as an early signal. I would neither sell in panic nor continue to assume that capacity reductions are deepening. I would judge the situation by whether supply remains tight and how much room the share price still offers.

During the downturn, I watch whether sow reductions are building the conditions for a turn. During the upturn, I watch whether valuation per head already captures the improvement in supply and demand. If capacity cuts continue and supply keeps tightening, I can give the cycle time. If valuation reflects the improvement fully, or recovering capacity starts to ease the shortage, I should consider leaving.

That is the boundary of my use of history. The 2022 and 2024 samples show valuations the market has assigned before. This cycle's sow herd and actual supply determine how relevant those comparisons remain. Capturing the main part of the move is enough; I can leave the final stretch to someone else.

Data notes

Historical valuations depend on sales scale and the statistical window; Dongrui's market-hog disclosures are incomplete for part of the sample. Corresponding share prices use assumed sales volumes and need to be assessed against this cycle's supply and demand.

Full data and methodology · Download data and calculation files


This article records a personal research framework and conditional judgments. It is not investment advice, a promise of returns or a basis for buying or selling securities. The cobweb model, historical percentiles and market capitalisations and share prices calculated from sales assumptions are research tools. They do not represent assured prices or fixed trading targets for this cycle. Markets and companies can change. Investors should verify information independently and bear their own investment risks.

Previous articleWaiting for Hog Prices to Turn Higher: My Bull Case for the Hog Cycle and How I Choose My ExposureNext articleTianbang’s Restructuring: Look Past the Good News—What Entry Price Offers a Chance of Profit?

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  • Prices remain low; the conditions for a turn are forming
  • When the upturn arrives, valuations per head help identify the high ground
  • History provides a scale; current conditions determine which one to use